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Legal Issues in Secondary School Athletics 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Participating in high school athletics has become a way of 
life for a large number of American adolescents.1 Unfortunate-
ly, being involved in legal procedures has also become an Amer-
ican way of life. 2 Since both activities often intersect, high 
school administrators and coaches responsible for athletic pro-
grams should be aware of the legal ramifications and liabilities 
such programs may incur. There are two types of legal claims 
often made against high school athletic programs: (1) violation 
of right&'discrimination, and (2) injury negligence claims. 
Administrators should be aware that claims of personal 
rights violation are common in society today. Thus, 
administrators need to understand how to comply with the 
legal requirements that will help alleviate the expense of de-
fending these types of suits. Winning a lawsuit may save mon-
ey by avoiding damage awards. However, never having a suit 
filed against you saves even more by also avoiding court costs 
and attorney's fees. 
Generally, injured athletes are reluctant to sue schools and 
coaches for injuries. However, this reluctance decreases as the 
severity of the injury increases. 3 Because courts grant a sub-
stantial number of large damage awards, administrators should 
be aware of the standard of care to which they are legally held 
and take precautions to stay within that standard. 
II. VIOLATION OF RIGHT&'I)ISCRIMINATION 
Courts have not defined participation in athletics as a 
1. "Approximately seven million students are engaged in some type of inter-
scholastic sport during the school year." Eugene C. Bjorklun, Assumption of Risk 
and Its Effect on School Liability for Athletic Injuries, 55 Enuc. L. REP. 349 (1989). 
2. Two hundred thousand civil suits were filed in federal courts in 1982. 
Twelve million cases were filed in state courts in 1977. IRVIN A. KELLER & 
CHARLES D. FORSYTIIE, ADMINISTRATION OF HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETICS, 362 (7th ed. 
1984). 
3. Bjorklun, supra note 1 at 349-350. 
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"right."4 In Darrin v. Gould,6 the Washington Supreme Court 
granted females a right to participate in football based on a 
state equal rights amendment. The court recognized that the 
United States Supreme Court has refused to hold "education" 
as a fundamental right guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution, let alone define participation in athletics as 
such.6 
Since participation is not a right, what standard will courts 
use in cases involving discrimination claims? To see if partici-
pation rules are rationally related to a legitimate purpose, 
courts will ask whether the rules further a reasonable goal of 
the athletic program. When rules of participation have been 
established, courts will not disturb the ruling board's authority, 
so long as the rules are not arbitrary.7 If the court finds that 
the rules are arbitrary, it will likely nullify them and require 
the board to establish regulations consistent with the court's 
opinion.8 
Rules which the courts have found acceptable include: re-
4. Morrison v. Roberts, 82 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Okla. 1938). See also Thompson v. 
Fayette County Pub. Sch., 786 S.W.2d 879, 881-82 (Ky. App. 1990) ("[l]ntersch-
olastic activities are only a mere expectation and do not amount to an entitlement. 
. . . [A] student has neither a property interest nor any fundamental right to 
participate in extracurricular activities in Kentucky."). 
5. 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975). 
6. Id. at 886-87. See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
7. Morrison, 82 P.2d at 1025. Furthermore, one Utah court has stated: 
It is not for the courts to be concerned with the wisdom or propriety of 
the resolution as to its social desirability, nor whether it best serves the 
objectives of education, nor with the convenience or inconvenience of its 
application to the plaintiff in his particular circumstances. So long as the 
resolution is deemed by the Board of Education to serve the purpose of 
best promoting the objectives of the school and the standards for eligibili-
ty are based upon [a] uniformly applied classification which bear[s] some 
reasonable relationship to the objectives, it cannot be said to be ca· 
pricious, arbitrary or unjustly discriminatory. 
Starkey v. Bd. of Educ. of Davis County Sch. Dist., 381 P.2d 718, 720 (Utah, 
1963). See also Brown v. Wells, 181 N.W.2d 708, 711 (Minn. 1970). ("[W]e must be 
controlled by well-established authority which recognizes it is the duty of courts, 
regardless of personal views or individual philosophies, to uphold regulations adopt· 
ed by administrative authorities unless those regulations are clearly arbitrary and 
unreasonable"); Thompson, 786 S.W.2d at 882 (policy requiring minimum grade 
point average "does not in any way exceed the reasonable and legitimate interests 
of the school system . . . . the policy is reasonable and without arbitrariness."). 
8. Brenden v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) (finding there 
was no rational basis for concluding that women are incapable of competing with 
men in non-contact sports and refused to determine that there was a rational basis 
to preclude females from participating in contact sports). 
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quiring a minimum grade point average for students in order to 
participate in interscholastic athletics;9 rules declaring stu-
dents ineligible to participate on a school team if they partici-
pate on an independent team in the same sport;10 rules mak-
ing students ineligible if they accept certain awards;11 and 
rules stating that married students are ineligible to participate 
in extracurricular activities.12 
In Starkey, decided in 1963, the rationale for not allowing 
married students to participate in interscholastic athletics was 
that "[teenage] marriages should be discouraged; and further, 
that when they do occur it is desirable that the parties devote 
more time and attention to the serious responsibilities involved 
rather than spend the extra time needed for extracurricular 
school activities."13 With society's changing attitudes it is like-
ly that a court today would not uphold a similar rule. One ra-
tionale that still may have influence is the idea the schools 
want to decrease the number of students that "drop out" before 
completing their high school education. Marriage is a factor 
that generally increases the drop out rate.14 
The same standard is applied when handicapped students 
sue a school to allow them to participate in athletic programs. 
Whether the action is brought under § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973,15 or under an equal protection theory, the 
same standard is used. The test is whether there exists a justi-
fiable or reasonable basis for the action. Most of these cases 
will hinge on the medical evidence of the risk of injury and 
whether the student is "otherwise qualified," as required by the 
statute.16 
9. Thompson, 786 S.W.2d at 882. 
10. Brown, 181 N.W.2d at 711. 
11. Morrison, 82 P.2d at 1025. 
12. Starkey, 381 P.2d at 720-21. 
13. Id. at 721. 
14. Id. at 720-21. 
15. 29 u.s.c. § 794 (1988). 
16. Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2nd Cir. 1977), states: 
[E]xclusion of handicapped children from school activity is not improper if 
there exists a substantial justification for the school's policy. [The statute] 
prohibits only the exclusion of handicapped persons who are "otherwise 
qualified." Here, the defendants have relied on medical opinion that chil-
dren with sight in only one eye are not qualified to play in contact sports 
because of the high risk of eye injury. 
In cases where plaintiffs have supplied appropriate medical evidence to show 
the risk of injury to the handicapped student is minimal, the parents and student 
were willing to accept the risk, and the students were "otherwise qualified," the 
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Can a school keep a female from participating on a male 
team? When no similar female sport is offered, courts often fmd 
rules prohibiting females from participating on male teams in 
non-contact sports to be both arbitrary and unreasonable.17 As 
articulated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit: 
The question in this case is not whether the plaintiffs have an 
absolute right to participate in interscholastic athletics, but 
whether the plaintiffs can be denied the benefits of activities 
provided by the state for male students.18 
Congress passed Title IX which requires that no person be 
excluded or denied benefits, on the basis of sex, from an educa-
tional program or activity receiving federal funds. 19 This 
correlates with the fact that some states, and the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), have changed their 
rules to allow females to participate in male non-contact sports 
when no equivalent female team is offered. 20 
The question concerning contact sports has not been as 
frequently addressed as the non-contact sport question. The 
Darrin court did allow females to participate in football, a male 
contact sport. 21 Darrin, however, was based on a Washington 
State equal rights amendment which the court felt granted 
more protection than that which already existed under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the U. S. Constitution.22 
To avoid unnecessary litigation, administrators and coach-
es should: (1) identify the objectives of the athletic program; (2) 
establish rules which are rationally related to the objectives of 
the program; and (3) consistently administer those rules. 
III. NEGLIGENCE 
When a student is injured while participating in interscho-
lastic athletics he or she may bring a suit for negligence 
against coaches, trainers, athletic directors, principals, and 
courts have upheld the students' right to participate. See Poole v. South Plainfield 
Bd. of Educ., 490 F.Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980); Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 
550 F. Supp. 418 (E.D.Pa. 1982). 
17. See Brenden v. lndep. Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) (aff.trming 
trial court). 
18. /d. at 1297. 
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988). 
20. Brenden, 477 F.2d at 1301. 
21. Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975). 
22. Id. 
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school boards. In such a suit, the issue will normally be 
whether the defendants have properly discharged their duty. 
Have they met the standard of care required by law in per-
forming their job? Defendants may defend themselves against a 
negligence claim by arguing: (1) that state law prevents them 
from being sued, or in the alternative, that (2) the person suing 
was aware of the risk of participation and voluntarily accepted 
that risk. These approaches are referred to as immunity and 
assumption of risk defenses. 
A. Standard of Care. 
Coaches and administrators should understand the 
standard of care owed to an athlete. Eugene C. Bjorklun23 
summarizes this standard as: 
-Providing proper and adequate instruction and supervision; 
-Providing and maintaining safe facilities and equipment; 
-Providing proper medical attention; and 
-Reasonably selecting and matching participants.24 
More specific duties of coaches and athletic directors are given 
by Keller and Forsythe:25 
Athletic Directors: 
1. The purchase of recognized quality protective player 
equipment. 
2. Making sure the athletic field or floor is kept free of 
any hazards. 
3. Providing ample supervision in implementing safety 
measures in all phases of the athletic program, including 
transportation. 
4. Sponsoring in-service programs to keep coaches and 
athletic trainers up to date in providing for the health and 
safety of athletes. 
5. Supervising the distribution of safety guidelines and 
policies to athletes and their parents. 
6. Making certain all coaches properly instruct players 
in the fundamental and particular playing techniques for the 
sports concerned and warn them of the risks involved. 
23. See Bjorklun, supra note 1. 
24. Id. at 351. 
25. KElLER & FORSYTHE, ADMINISTRATION OF HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETICS 365-66 
(7th ed. 1984). 
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7. Keeping complete records of all athletic injuries. 
8. Recommending only fully qualified coaches for em-
ployment. 
9. Arranging for adequate medical supervision. 
10. Contracting competent game officials. 
Coaches: 
1. Keeping abreast of the latest knowledge and tech-
niques in the cause and prevention of injuries. 
2. Regularly inspecting all player and game equipment 
to make certain they meet required safety standards. 
3. Properly fitting all athletes with protective equip-
ment for the sport involved. 
4. Carefully instructing players in the use of all safety 
equipment. 
5. Making certain all practice and playing fields and 
floors are free of hazards. 
6. Thoroughly acquainting players with rules of safety 
contained in the games rules, including special points of em-
phasis. 
7. Carefully instructing players in all safety techniques 
and requiring their use in practice and competition. 
8. Issuing clear warnings of the risks taken in the 
sport and of possible injuries from failure to apply all safety 
measures, particularly of such acts as using the head in butt 
blocking, spearing, and so on. 
9. Preparing a statement of safety policies and risks 
involved for distribution to players and parents. (It is wise to 
require verification that these have been read and understood 
and that they will be applied.) 
10. Providing sufficient and appropriate drills to proper-
ly condition athletes for the sport concerned. 
11. Allowing no athlete to start practice for a sport with-
out a certificate of fitness from a physician. 
12. Making certain all athletes are covered with athletic 
accident insurance prior to reporting to their first practice. 
13. Always acclimating athletes to heat and humidity 
factors. 
14. Making certain all vehicles transporting athletes are 
fully insured. 
15. Requiring parental permission for out-of-town trips. 
16. Providing proper supervision at all times and mak-
ing sure any faculty members assisting in supervision are 
properly instructed. 
17. Checking to see that proper medical supervision is 
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provided for both practices and games. 
18. Being prepared to administer first aid, but careful 
not to practice medicine. 
19. Keeping careful and complete records of all injuries, 
including circumstances. 
20. Exercising at all times the best judgment a reason-
able person would under the circumstances. 26 
B. The Leaky Umbrella of Immunity. 
93 
State law may grant immunity from suit to teachers and 
other certified educational employees. If such is the case, the 
plaintiff must overcome the immunity by proving wilful and 
wanton misconduct, which is a higher standard than mere 
negligence.27 
Whether a coach or administrator is covered by this immu-
nity umbrella is often unclear. For example, Garrity v. Beat-
t? involved a claim that the school district negligently 
permitted a student to wear an ill-fitting helmet and refused to 
furnish proper football equipment upon the student's request. 
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the school district knew, 
or should have known, the helmet was unlikely to prevent 
injury, and held for the plaintiff.29 
In Thomas v. Chicago Board of Education, 30 the Illinois 
appellate court expounded on Garrity by stating that inspection 
and testing of equipment was not a discretionary function of 
school board employees and are therefore not protected by im-
munity. 
Absent similar wilful and wanton misconduct, school 
boards are immune from prosecution for negligence when they 
hire improperly trained or educated coaches because this is a 
supervisory function. Coaches are covered by the same criteria 
in their role of supervision and training.31 
In Vargo v. Svitchan,32 a student was injured in a sum-
mer weight training program that was contrary to state high 
school athletic association rules. The Michigan Court of Ap-
26. Id. 
27. Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 347 N.E.2d 705, 709 (Ill. 1976). 
28. 373 N.E.2d 1323 (Ill. 1976). 
29. Id. 
30. 377 N.E.2d 55 (App. Ill. 1978). 
31. Id. 
32. 301 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. App. 1980). 
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peals held that the superintendent was covered by governmen-
tal immunity but the principal and athletic director were not. 
However, in Gasper v. Friedel, 83 the South Dakota Supreme 
Court determined that the superintendent, school board mem-
bers and coaches were all performing discretionary functions in 
offering a summer weight lifting and conditioning program. 
Thus, they were protected by governmental immunity. Gasper 
differs from Vargo in that the program in Gasper complied with 
all rules of the state athletic association and the coach had 
given proper safety training to the students. The student was 
injured when he did not follow the safety instructions. The 
defendants in both cases were performing discretionary duties. 
However, in Gasper the training program was in accordance 
with association rules and the coach had given proper safety in-
structions, indicating no wilful or wanton negligence. 
Courts have articulated the immunity issue poorly. They 
seem to construe the test for immunity depending on whether 
or not the activity is discretionary, with a notion that wilful or 
wanton negligence negates the immunity. Arguably, individuals 
who are not granted immunity are those who demonstrate 
wanton negligence. 
Immunity is not a sure-flre defense because it is statutorily 
created and some states may not have immunity statutes. Im-
munity also depends on whether the coaches and 
administrators' activities are discretionary. Unfortunately, 
courts determine what is a discretionary activity. Therefore, a 
wise administrator will not depend on immunity as a defense. 
C. The Dubious Defense of Assumption of Risk. 
Claiming a plaintiff was aware of the risk and voluntarily 
accepted that risk is another possible defense. Bjorklun points 
out several problems school administrators face when relying 
on this "assumption of risk" defense to a negligence claim. 
First, assumption of risk is not available in some states. 34 Sec-
ond, depending on the student's age, that student may be held 
to a lower standard of care than an adult. 35 
Some school districts thought that by having participants 
and parents sign waivers, courts would find that the student 
33. 450 N.W.2d 226 (S.D. 1990). 
34. Bjorklun, supra note 1 at 355. 
35. Id. 
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and parents expressly assumed the risk. Bjorklun points out 
the problem with this approach. Because all high school 
athletes are minors, they can disavow contracts and invalidate 
waivers at any time. Parents can contractually waive their own 
rights but they can not waive their children's rights.86 
The Washington Supreme Court, in Wagenblast v. Odessa 
School District, 37 disallowed waiver forms as a participation 
requirement. The court held the waivers invalid as a violation 
of public policy.86 Bjorklun concludes that signing a waiver 
can show a jury that the participant assumed the risk of partic-
ipation. However, this conclusion assumes there was no negli-
gence adding to the risk. If such assumption is true, the injury 
was never actionable. 39 Therefore, administrators should not 
depend upon waivers to save them from negligence claims. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the number of students participating in interscholastic 
athletics increases, so too does the likelihood of injuries. Be-
cause society has become more litigious, athletic administrators 
and coaches must be aware of the legal issues involved in oper-
ating athletic programs. 
Knowledge is the key. Administrators and coaches should 
be aware of current litigation in this area.40 Responsible ad-
ministrators and coaches will implement rules of participation 
which are related to reasonable objectives of the athletic pro-
gram. They will also know and meet the standard of care to 
avoid-or when unavoidable, to win-lawsuits. Funding for 
education is a precious resource that should not be wasted in 
needless litigation. 
Jearlene Leishman 
36. Id. at 357. 
37. 758 P.2d 968 (1988). 
38. Id. 
39. Bjorklun, supra note 1 at 358. 
40. The LegaLetter, published by Wheatland Group Holdings, Inc. is an excel-
lent resouree to aid the administrator in keeping abreast of current litigation on 
issues involving athletics. It is published and distributed to members of the Fund 
Administrators Association and subscribers to the Mutual Legal Aid Pact. The 
address for Wheatland Group Holdings, Inc. is: P.O. Box 2159, Topeka, KS 66601-
2159. 
